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Abstract
Expressivism promises an illuminating account of the nature of norma-
tive judgment. But worries about the details of expressivist semantics have
led many to doubt whether expressivism’s putative advantages can be secured.
Drawing on insights from linguistic semantics and decision theory, I develop a
novel framework for implementing an expressivist semantics that I call order-
ing expressivism. I argue that by systematically interpreting the orderings that
ĕgure in analyses of normative terms in terms of the basic practical attitude of
conditional weak preference, the expressivist can explain the semantic prop-
erties of normative sentences in terms of the logical properties of that attitude.
Expressivism’s problems with capturing the logical relations among normative
sentences can be reduced to the familiar, more tractable problem of explain-
ing certain coherence constraints on preferences. Particular attention is given
to the interpretation of wide-scope negation. e proposed solution is also
extended to other types of embedded contexts—most notably, disjunctions.
*anks to Jamie Dreier, Kit Fine, Allan Gibbard, Sarah Moss, Peter Railton, Ian Rumĕtt, Mark
Schroeder, Scott Sturgeon, Eric Swanson, audiences at the  Central APA, MIT, the University
of Birmingham, and the University of Michigan, and an anonymous referee for Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research for valuable comments and discussion.
 e expressivist program
Expressivism is something of a four-letter word in some circles. (“Is that not triply
a lie?”) And yet there is something persistently alluring about its research program.
ough expressivism was originally developed as a metaethical position about nor-
mative language and judgment, its appeal has extended across philosophical disci-
plines. Expressivist semantics have been given for a diverse class of expressions—not
just for normative terms like ‘ought’, ‘wrong’, and ‘rational’, but also for epistemic
terms like ‘might’ and ‘probably’, for attitude verbs like ‘knows’ and ‘believes’, and
even for ‘means’ itself. Expressivismpromises an illuminating account of themean-
ings of such expressions, the nature of judgments involving them, and the connec-
tion between such judgments and motivation or action. But foundational worries
about the details of expressivist semantics have led many to doubt whether these
advantages can be obtained.
On a standard truth-conditional semantics the semantic properties of sentences
(e.g., inconsistencies, entailments) are, in the ĕrst instance, explained in terms of
properties of the contents of those sentences: To a very rough ĕrst approximation,
the sentences ‘Grass is green’ and ‘Grass is not green’ are inconsistent because they
have incompatible truth-conditions. e primary explanatory weight is placed on
an assignment of contents to sentences and on relations among those items of con-
tent. Expressivists take a diﬀerent tack. ough it is somewhat contentious how
best to understand expressivism, I take as my starting point the following famil-
iar characterization. At the explanatory outset, the expressivist attempts to account
for the semantic properties of sentences in terms of properties of the attitudes or
states of mind that utterances of those sentences conventionally express. Contents
or truth-conditions, even if or when they are assigned to sentences, do no work in
fundamental explanations of the semantic properties of those sentences. Expres-
sivists can be understood as accepting the following requirement on fundamental
See, e.g., H , ; P ; B , ; G , , ,
; F ; H & T ; Y , ; S a; S
; M . I will treat expressivism as a thesis primarily about natural language expressions
rather than concepts.
See, e.g., R : –; U : , ; S b: , , ; D
: . ere may be good reasons to think there are positions deserving to be called ‘expressivist’
that don’t proceed in this way (see C , S b). But since this is a standard way of
understanding expressivism, I accept it here for the sake of argument.

semantic explanation:
  
e semantic properties of sentences are to be explained, fundamentally, in
terms of properties of the attitudes conventionally expressed by utterances of
those sentences.
In the case of ordinary factual sentences, this requirementmight not seemoverly
diﬃcult to satisfy. For example, the meaning of ‘Grass is green’ would be explained
in terms of the belief that grass is green, or what it is to bear the belief relation toward
a certain representational content. And the inconsistency between ‘Grass is green’
and ‘Grass is not green’ would be explained in terms of the incoherence in both
believing that grass is green and believing that grass is not green. ere is of course
something to be explained here, but this, as they say, is everyone’s problem.
Fortunately for us who like a good metaethical puzzle, expressivists standardly
deny that all declarative sentences express ordinary factual beliefs. (Probably why
expressivist treatments of ‘Grass is green’ tend not to get a lot of press.) It is with
these sentences that expressivism gets its teeth. An expressivist about some linguistic
expression E claims (perhaps inter alia) that E-sentences don’t conventionally rep-
resent how the world, narrowly construed, might be, or even where or when one
might be located in the world. E-sentences don’t conventionally determine ordi-
nary possible worlds propositions; they don’t have truth-conditions in the canonical
sense. Insofar as E-expressions can ĕgure in valid reasoning and be embedded in
complex linguistic environments, the expressivist must give an alternative account
of what their meanings are, and how these meanings compositionally interact with
the meanings of other expressions to determine the meanings of expressions of ar-
bitrary complexity. is is a technical challenge, but, given   -
, it isn’t merely technical. Whatever formal solution is given, the expressivist
must provide a systematic way of interpreting the formalism, and of characterizing
what states of mind correspond to what formal objects in such a way that explains
the semantic properties of the sentences that express those states of mind.
is is the root of the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Many have regarded
it as fatal to expressivism. But I am more optimistic. In this paper I develop a
novel framework for implementing an expressivist semantics that I call ordering ex-
pressivism. Drawing on developments in linguistic semantics and decision theory,
I argue that ordering expressivism provides a formally and interpretively adequate
“So-called” because it was prominently raised by G (, ), who attributed it to
Frege’s distinction between content and assertoric force. See also S .

solution to the Frege-Geach problem. For concreteness I focus on expressivist treat-
ments of normative terms, but the points can be applied to expressivist treatments
of other expressions. Following work by Jamie Dreier, I treat the semantic proper-
ties of sentences as explained, fundamentally, in terms of coherence constraints on
attitudes. I then show how to implement this idea in an existing, general composi-
tional semantic framework. e resulting view addresses complications concerning
indecision, indiﬀerence, and incomparability, and generalizes to cover normative,
non-normative, and mixed sentences. is avoids limitations in previous accounts.
Ordering expressivism constitutes a more secure semantic basis for a broader ex-
pressivist theory of language and judgment.
e structure of the paper is as follows. I focus primarily on one prominent in-
stance of the Frege-Geach problem: the interpretation of wide-scope negation (“the
negation problem”). § characterizes the problem. § considers three prominent
accounts— those by Allan Gibbard, Mark Schroeder, and Jamie Dreier— in terms
of which I will situate my proposed solution. § motivates and develops the or-
dering expressivist framework and shows how it can solve the negation problem.
§ extends the proposed treatment of negation to the case of other types of em-
bedded contexts, with particular attention to Mark Schroeder’s recent problem of
“mixed disjunctions.” Ordering expressivism combines the advantages of Gibbard’s
and Dreier’s accounts while avoiding their limitations.
 e negation problem
e negation problem is the problem of saying in general what attitude corresponds
towide-scope negation—what attitude is expressed by sentences of the form ‘¬’—
and of doing so in such a way that captures how a normative sentence and its nega-
tion are logically contradictory, as per   .
Let’s ĕll this in. Consider the following normative sentence.
 Alice has to help the poor.
For the expressivist, the meaning of  is, in the ĕrst instance, to be given, not
in terms of its content or truth-conditions, but in terms of the attitude or state of
mind it conventionally expresses. For concreteness, say  expresses the attitude
of requiring Alice to help the poor. Now consider  .
  Alice has to not help the poor.

Since the deontic modal ‘have to’ is the primary operator in   as it is in
,  , the expressivist tells us, expresses the same sort of attitude as
. No fancy footwork necessary:   expresses the attitude of requiring
Alice not to help the poor. e internal negation— the negation within the scope
of ‘have to’—poses no new challenges.
We have accounts of what attitudes are expressed by  and  . But
what about  ?
  Alice doesn’t have to help the poor. (/It’s not the case that Alice has to
help the poor.)
In   we have an external negation, a negation that takes scope over ‘have
to’. What attitude should we say that   expresses? Because of  -
 , not just any answer will do. Since   is the contradictory
of , the attitude expressed by must be related in the right sort of way
to the attitude of requiring Alice to help the poor to reĘect the logical inconsistency
between  and  .
First, does   express the requiring attitude toward Alice not helping
the poor? No. Both requiring  and requiring ¬might be incompatible in such a
way as to capture the inconsistency between a sentence and its negation. But as we
just saw, the attitude of requiring Alice not to help the poor is the attitude expressed
by the internally negated sentence  . And   and   don’t
have the same meaning or express the same attitude.
Second, does  express the lack of the requiring attitude, the attitude of
failing to require Alice to help the poor? No. Both requiring  and failing to require
 might be incompatible in such a way as to capture the inconsistency between a
sentence and its negation. But the attitude of failing to require Alice to help the
poor is the attitude ascribed in  —with, say, Bert as subject—but the
attitude we need to explain is the attitude ascribed in  .
  Bert doesn’t believe that Alice has to help the poor.
  Bert believes that Alice doesn’t have to help the poor.
 , but not  , is true if Bert has no views on whether Alice
has to help the poor.
ird, does   express the attitude of permitting Alice not to help the
poor. Yes! But because of   we aren’t oﬀ the hook just yet.
What we need to explain is how  and   are logically inconsistent. But
if we take the attitudes of permitting and requiring as basic, we must stipulate how

they are logically related, i.e., that requiring  is inconsistent with permitting ¬.
But this is precisely what we need to explain. Sure enough,   expresses an
attitude of permitting. But the problem is to say how this attitude is logically related
to the attitude of requiring, and to do so in such a way that doesn’t presuppose an
interpretation of external negation.
In sum, we started by saying that the unembedded sentence  expresses an
attitude of requiring. We then asked what attitude its negation   expresses
that captures the logical inconsistency between the two sentences. Neither way of
inserting a negation into the requiring attitude— failing to require  and requiring¬—captures the attitude expressed by . Sowemight posit a distinct atti-
tude, an attitude of permitting, and say that it corresponds to the external negation
of ‘have to’. ough   does express an attitude of permitting, we cannot
stop here lest we leave opaque the logical relations between the distinct attitudes
of requiring and permitting and thus, given   , between
the sentences that express them. So, either we capture the inconsistency between
 and   but get the attitudes expressed wrong, or we get the attitudes
expressed right but fail to capture the inconsistency. is is the negation problem.
 A stylized history
A brief recap—or at least a stylized history—of the current state of play will be
instructive. For purposes of situating my positive account, I will focus on devel-
opments stemming from work by Allan Gibbard and Jamie Dreier, understood in
part in the context of work by Mark Schroeder. In this section I will highlight what
I take to be the crucial advances in their accounts, and will raise several problems
and potential limitations. In §§– I will develop a framework for implementing an
expressivist semantics that combines the virtues of Gibbard’s and Dreier’s accounts
while avoiding their costs.
. Enter Gibbard
In his response to the Frege-Geach problem, Allan Gibbard (, ) introduces
an extension of ordinary possible worlds semantics. Rather than treating the con-
See especially U , , G , D , , S a,b,c,
H & T .
anks to Jamie Dreier and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion about how best to
situate my positive account.

tents of sentences as (determining) sets of possible worlds, Gibbard () treats
the contents of sentences as (determining) sets of pairs of possible worlds and hy-
perplans. A hyperplan is a maximal contingency plan, a plan that, for any occasion
for choice one might conceivably be in and for any action open on that occasion,
either forbids or permits— either rejects or rejects rejecting— that action on that
occasion (: ); it represents the plan of someone who is maximally decided.
e content of an attitude or judgment is given in terms of the world-hyperplan
pairs— the possible ways things might be factually and normatively— that it rules
out.
On ĕrst glance it might seem that the model theory itself suﬃces for a response
to the negation problem. One might say the following. e content of  is a
certain set of hyperplans, those that require Alice to help the poor. Since negation
means set complementation, the content of   is the complement set of
hyperplans. Since these two sets of hyperplans are disjoint, we have incompatibility
of content. So we predict the inconsistency of the sentences. We’re home free.
Or not. As Gibbard himself recognizes— along with many interpreters aer
him— the formal semantics isn’t suﬃcient for an expressivist response to the nega-
tion problem. As per   , the expressivist cannot help her-
self to content or truth-conditions, even of a more ĕne-grained sort, to explain the
semantic properties of sentences. Rather, the fundamental explanation of the in-
consistency of  and  must be in terms of the nature of the attitudes
expressed. e expressivist must systematically interpret the formal objects in ques-
tion by mapping them onto psychological attitudes whose individual natures and
interrelations do the explaining of the semantic properties in question.
en what is Gibbard up to? e crucial contribution of Gibbard’s account,
on my view, is that it starts with an existing framework for doing formal seman-
tics—possible worlds semantics— and then systematically provides that framework
with an expressivist interpretation. e compositional semantics proceeds roughly
as usual; the abstract objects that Gibbard uses as semantic values— sets of world-
hyperplan pairs— function like sets of possible worlds. What makes Gibbard’s use
of the framework distinctively “expressivist” is the interpretation he gives for it. Gib-
bard’s expressivist extension of possible worlds semantics thus provides a crucial
piece of apparatus for what Simon Blackburn () once called a “fast track” so-
lution to the general Frege-Geach problem. By systematically interpreting elements
of a familiar formal apparatus in terms of states of mind, Gibbard oﬀers a general
e theory in G  is couched in terms of “systems of norms.”
Cf. U : ; D : , : , ; S b: .

strategy for implementing an overall expressivist semantic theory.
e prospects for Gibbard’s account turn on the details of the expressivist inter-
pretations he gives for the various elements of the formalism. For the particular case
of negation, one way of interpreting Gibbard is as attempting to solve the negation
problem through the completeness of hyperplans (see esp. : –, –). A
hyperplan represents the plans of an agent who is fully decided about what to do.
For any relevant circumstance and available action, a hyperplan either rejects the
action or permits it— that is, either disagrees with performing it or disagrees with
disagreeing with performing it. A hyperplan that fails to require ¬ (fails to disagree
with ) ipso facto permits . We can thus interdeĕne the attitudes of requiring and
permitting without external negation: permitting  is deĕned as disagreeing with re-
quiring ¬. Negation corresponds to a basic attitude of disagreeing. Roughly,
expresses an attitude of requiring Alice to help the poor, and   expresses
an attitude of disagreeing with requiring Alice to help the poor. ese attitudes are
plausibly related in the right sort of way as to explain the logical inconsistency be-
tween the sentences that express them. Permitting is interdeĕned with requiring so
as to illuminate the logical relations among sentences that express those attitudes.
In § we noted that we must distinguish thinking that one doesn’t have to do
something— thinking its contradictory is permitted— from not thinking that one
has to do something—not thinking it is required. I have twoworries with Gibbard’s
account of negation, which stem from two ways in which these attitudes can come
apart: indecision and decided agnosticism.
First, human agents aren’t hyperplanners. We can be undecided. So, the ex-
pressivist must be able to represent a state of indecision, and distinguish it from
states of permitting or indiﬀerence. e challenge is to do so in a manner amenable
to expressivism, i.e., not in terms of agents’ beliefs. One must be able to say more
than that, fundamentally, indiﬀerence between alternatives is believing them to be
equally good (in the relevant sense), and indecision about alternatives is having no
D (: –), S (b: –), and C (b: , –)
interpret Gibbard’s completeness constraint on hyperplans as requiring hyperplans to either require
or forbid every available action. I view this interpretation as incorrect. Gibbard is clear that a hy-
perplan can merely permit an action (permit but not require it); contrary actions can be tied for best
according to a hyperplan (see G : n.; : ). Schroeder (b: n.) claims
that Gibbard’s argument that normative terms pick out natural properties relies on the claim that hy-
perplanners cannot be indiﬀerent. I disagree. e argument relies on there being a natural property
P that describes what is permitted by the hyperplan in a situation; but I don’t see why this property
couldn’t be a disjunctive property. In any case, it isn’t my aim to be doing Gibbard exegesis. What
will be important is that the view described in the main text (which I am attributing to Gibbard) is
insuﬃcient.

belief about which is better (in the relevant sense). e worry isn’t that Gibbard’s
formal framework doesn’t have enough structure to represent the distinction be-
tween undecided and indiﬀerent states of mind. It does. But we need some story
about what it is about an agent’s state of mind such that the one type of abstract
object rather than the other represents that state of mind. Absent such a story, the
worry is that any adequate one will be incompatible with expressivism (cf. D
: –).
Second, even restricting our attention to decided states of mind, Gibbard’s way
of interdeĕning permitting and requiringmischaracterizes these attitudes and hence
the attitudes intuitively expressed by  and  . Even if one is fully de-
cided, one can disagree with requiring  because one rejects taking any attitude to-
ward . One might take neutrality to be the stance to take; one might be decidedly
agnostic. Disagreeing with requiring  isn’t equivalent to permitting ¬, even in the
context of a hyperplan. One might reply that the relevant attitude of disagreement
is a decided state of mind that is incompatible with agnosticism. But this raises the
worry that wemay no longer be trading in a familiar general notion of disagreement
in attitude. e worry is that this assumes precisely what needs to be explained,
namely, that there is a such an attitude and that it needn’t be understood in terms
of belief.
. Enter Dreier
In response to the problem of distinguishing indiﬀerence from indecision, Jamie
Dreier (; cf. : –) proposes to take the attitude of strict preference as
basic and then deĕne the attitude of indiﬀerence in terms of preference. On Dreier’s
deĕnition, someone is indiﬀerent (“deĕned indiﬀerent”) between two options  and
 iﬀ (a) she doesn’t prefer  to  and doesn’t prefer  to , and (b) for any option
, she prefers  to  iﬀ she prefers  to  and prefers  to  iﬀ she prefers  to
 (: ; cf. B : ). One is indiﬀerent between two alternatives
iﬀ one prefers each of them to exactly the same things, and one prefers exactly the
same things to each of them. One is undecided between two alternatives iﬀ one isn’t
indiﬀerent between them and one fails to prefer either alternative to the other. Ac-
cording to these deĕnitions, whereas indiﬀerence is a transitive relation, indecision
is not. (I might be undecided between eating ten jellybeans and eating a donut, and
undecided between eating a donut and eating eleven jellybeans, though I prefer eat-
ing eleven jellybeans to eating ten.) So, says Dreier, we can cash out the attitude of
Cf. U : –; H : ; G : –.
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indiﬀerence, and distinguish it from indecision, in terms of the more basic practical
attitude of strict preference.
e crucial advance in Dreier’s account, in my view, is its move to interdeĕne
various relevant attitudes in terms of a more basic practical attitude— in Dreier’s
case, strict preference— the logic of which is used to explain the semantic proper-
ties of normative sentences. To see the importance of this move, it can be helpful
to situate Dreier’s account in the context of Mark Schroeder’s (a, b) way
of framing the negation problem. Schroeder distinguishes two types of ways that
states of mind can be inconsistent. States of mind areA-type inconsistent iﬀ they are
the same attitude toward inconsistent contents. Believing that  and believing that¬ is an example of A-type inconsistency. States of mind are B-type inconsistent iﬀ
they are “distinct and apparently logically unrelated attitudes toward the same con-
tent” (b: ; emphasis in original). Requiring  and permitting  is (allegedly)
an example of B-type inconsistency. According to Schroeder, expressivists can help
themselves to A-type inconsistency but not to B-type inconsistency; helping them-
selves to B-type inconsistency would be helping themselves to everything they need
to explain, namely, how certain attitudes can be inconsistent in a way that doesn’t
ultimately reduce to their being inconsistent beliefs.
WhatDreier’s account highlights is thatA-type inconsistency isn’t the only prom-
ising model of inconsistency in attitude. Not all logical relations among attitudes
need be explained in terms of logical relations among the objects of those attitudes.
If we can interdeĕne requiring and permitting in terms of preference, then the in-
consistency between sentences like and  needn’t be explained either
in terms of distinct fundamental attitudes or a single attitude toward inconsistent
contents. e inconsistency could be explained in terms of familiar coherence con-
straints on preferences (more on which in §). Like belief, preference has a logic;
combinations of preferences can be incoherent. Suppose you prefer to go back to
sleep, but also prefer not to lose your job. If you realize that the onlyway to keep your
job is to get up, then something in your attitudes “has to change,” as Dreier (:
) puts it, like how something would “have to change” if you believed that all
ravens are black and that Tweety is a raven but see that Tweety isn’t black. If norma-
tive sentences express preferences, then andwould be inconsistent,
the thought goes, because they express an incoherent body of preferences. Dreier
himself only sketches how to apply this model, and only for simple cases. I won’t
ultimately be taking up his apparent suggestions about how to do so. What is im-
anks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to frame the importance of Dreier’s ac-
count in this way.
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portant here is that Dreier’s proposal brings into a relief a strategy for responding to
the negation problem that may avoid the putative problems detailed in S
a for expressivist accounts framed in terms of A-type inconsistency.
Despite these contributions, I would like to raise three worries for Dreier’s ac-
count. e ĕrst two aren’t intended to be decisive. I raise them simply to highlight
potential limitations in Dreier’s account. It would be preferable if we could develop
an expressivist theory that avoided them. e third limitation is more serious.
Call indiﬀerence according to Dreier’s deĕnition D-indiﬀerence. Suppose Chip
has the following preference structure. He prefers eating vanilla ice cream to be-
ing stabbed, he prefers chocolate ice cream to being stabbed, he prefers winning
the lottery to eating vanilla ice cream, and he prefers winning the lottery to eating
chocolate ice cream. However, he has never even considered the question of how to
compare vanilla and chocolate ice cream. So, he fails to prefer chocolate to vanilla
and fails to prefer vanilla to chocolate. Chip is D-indiﬀerent between eating choco-
late and eating vanilla. Both are ranked below the same alternatives—winning the
lottery—and both are ranked above the same alternatives—getting stabbed. But
Chip isn’t indiﬀerent between vanilla and chocolate; he is undecided between them.
So beingD-indiﬀerent isn’t suﬃcient for being indiﬀerent. One can beD-indiﬀerent
while still being intuitively undecided.
Dreier recognizes that cases like Chip’s pose a problem for his deĕnition (:
). He notes that his deĕnition “relies on there being a suﬃciently rich ĕeld of
preference” to exclude treating cases like Chip’s with incomplete preferences from
representing indiﬀerence. But cases like Chip’s cannot be regarded as “don’t cares”
by the theory. ey are precisely the sorts of preference structures that distinguish
indiﬀerence from indecision. (Or, as we will see shortly, they are at least one such
sort of preference structure.) Two alternatives can be D-indiﬀerent either by being
ranked the same, or by failing to be ranked relative to one another but bearing the
same relations to every other alternative. Only the former represents indiﬀerence.
Unless we assume that the preference relation is complete— and thereby rule out
indecision from the start— satisfying D-indiﬀerence isn’t suﬃcient for indiﬀerence.
ere is certainly more to be said in reply. I won’t press the worry any further
here. Suﬃce it to say that Dreier’s account requires that agents have a suitably rich
Dreier invokes preferences among lotteries— “objects engineered to enrich the ĕeld of prefer-
ence in just the way we need” (: )— to motivate that cases like Chip’s may be rare enough
that conĘating indiﬀerence and indecision in these cases won’t be such a serious bullet to bite. e
problem is that lotteries can do precisely what Dreier says: they can enrich agents’ preferences. De-
lineating an enhanced prospect, and forcing choices that involve it, can artiĕcially reĕne an agent’s
(incomplete) preference structure. It can function precisely to remove the basis for one’s indecision.

ĕeld of preferences in order to distinguish indiﬀerence and indecision. At mini-
mum, it is worth investigating whether we can develop an expressivist theory that
avoids this requirement.
A second limitation in Dreier’s account stems from a second way in which one’s
preferences can be incomplete. Lacking preference and not being (D-)indiﬀerent
isn’t suﬃcient for being undecided. Suppose you are forced to make a choice about
which of your children, A or B, to save and which to let die. You fail to prefer either
alternative to the other. But you aren’t indiﬀerent. You treat the lives of each your
children as uniquely precious. Being told, for example, that you could get a free box
of tissues if, but only if, you saved A, wouldn’t settle for you what to choose. You
prefer saving A and getting the tissues to just saving A without getting them, but
it’s not the case that you prefer saving A and getting the issues to just saving B. Your
attitude is “insensitive tomild sweetening,” as they say (H ; D S ).
And yet, intuitively, you aren’t undecided about what to prefer. You have considered
the question, and, we can suppose, no further reĘection would lead you to change
your attitude. You decidedly treat alternatives where you save A as incomparable to
alternatives where you save B. If this is right, the expressivist now has three attitudes
to distinguish: indiﬀerence, indecision, and what we might call “decidedly treating
as incomparable.”
Even if there are in fact no genuine incomparabilities in values, it isn’t impossible
to think otherwise. Whether it is rational is more contentious. is may aﬀect
whether an attitude of decidedly treating as incomparable is the sort of attitude that
needs to be characterized in giving an expressivist semantics. Nevertheless, it would
be preferable if the viability of expressivism wasn’t held hostage to these debates.
ird, and most importantly, Dreier’s account is only directly applied to sen-
tences that express pure practical states of mind. No attempt is made to implement
the account of normative language and preference in a general compositional se-
mantic theory. Doing so is non-negotiable. Some have thought that complex sen-
tences combining normative and non-normative clauses raise unique problems. An
adequate expressivist treatment of the purely normative fragment of the language
must generalize to cover non-normative sentences and mixed sentences as well.
Hypothetical choice can explain actual preference only insofar as the agent is already sensitive to and
decided among the relevant options.
Ruth Chang () claims that, in addition to incomparability, understood negatively as the
lack of any comparative relation, there is also a fourth positive value relation of “parity” (the other
three being “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good”). I will put aside any purported diﬀerences
between incomparability and parity in what follows.
For survey discussion, see H .

e lesson from this section is this: We need an account that combines the
virtues of Gibbard and Dreier. We need a way of integrating a Dreier-style account
of inconsistency in attitude into a general, independently motivated formal seman-
tic framework. We need a Gibbard-style fast-track apparatus with a Dreier-style
expressivist interpretation. In the remainder of the paper I will develop a positive
expressivist account that provides precisely this. is account also avoids the po-
tential limitations in Gibbard’s and Dreier’s accounts described in this section.
 e negation problem: A solution
. Ordering expressivism
Given    (§), merely oﬀering a formalism that assigns
contents to sentences won’t suﬃce for an expressivist explanation of the semantic
properties of normative sentences. Nevertheless I want to take a step back from 
  for a moment and simply examine how we might formally
distinguish the various attitudes in question. Perhaps the resulting formalism will
suggest new possibilities for expressivists to explore.
Forget the framework ofGibbardian hyperplans for amoment. Normative terms
are semantically modal. ey concern not what happens in the actual world—or
not merely what happens in the actual world—but what happens in certain alter-
native possibilities. On the consensus best theory in linguistic semantics, modal
expressions are analyzed in terms of an ordering semantics. Modals are inter-
preted as quantiĕers over possible worlds. e domain of quantiĕcation is set by
two parameters: a set of relevant (accessible) worlds and a preorder ≲ (a reĘexive
and transitive relation), where this preorder ranks worlds along a relevant dimen-
sion. Diﬀerent choices of accessibility relations and preorders correspond to diﬀer-
ent readings of modals— e.g., epistemic, deontic, goal-based. A modal quantiĕes
over the accessible worlds that rank (among the) highest in the preorder, i.e., that
aren’t ≲-bettered by any other world. Call these worlds the “≲-best” worlds. To a
ĕrst approximation, necessity modals like ‘have to’ and ‘must’ universally quantify
Equivalently, a premise semantics (L a). See especially L ,  F
, V , K , , . For simplicity I will make the limit assumption
(L : –) to ensure that there is a set of most highly ranked worlds. I will sometimes
follow common usage among philosophers and use ‘order’ and ‘ordering’ to refer to preorders (L
: ), though mathematicians typically reserve ‘order’ for speciĕcally antisymmetric preorders,
i.e. preorders that don’t permit ties. Familiar examples of preorders are the relations of being at least
as tall as, at least as clever as, etc.

over the set of ≲-best worlds, and possibility modals like ‘may’ existentially quantify
over the set of ≲-best worlds. For example, ‘According to the law, you have to pay
your taxes’ is true iﬀ you pay your taxes in all the relevant worlds that best approx-
imate the legal ideal. Since our concern here is with normative language, hereaer
I will assume that ≲ is a practical normative ranking of possibilities; ≲ can thus be
understood as reĘecting the content of a practical normative view.
Before getting all in a huﬀ about how the expressivist can’t appeal to such truth-
conditions to do fundamental explanatory work, notice that this framework appears
to make many of the distinctions we need. We could say that ≲ requires  iﬀ all the≲-best worlds are -worlds (worlds in which ‘’ is true); that ≲ forbids  iﬀ none
of the ≲-best worlds are -worlds; that ≲ merely permits  iﬀ some but not all of
the ≲-best worlds are -worlds; that ≲ is indiﬀerent between alternatives u and v iﬀ
u ≲ v ∧ v ≲ u; and that ≲ treats alternatives u and v as incomparable iﬀ u ≴ v ∧ v ≴ u.
(We will return to indecision below.)
is formal apparatus suggests the following strategy for the expressivist, given a
normative term ‘N ’ andpreorder≲ that ĕgures in the interpretation of ‘N ’-sentences:
How to solve the Frege-Geach problem:
. Interpret ≲ as some suitable practical attitude.
. Use of the logic of this basic attitude to capture the semantic properties of
‘N ’-sentences.
. Deĕne any other attitudes intuitively expressed by ‘N ’-sentences in terms of
the basic attitude corresponding to ≲.
is, schematically, is my proposal for how expressivists can solve the Frege-Geach
problem. Call an expressivist theory that makes use of this strategy ordering expres-
sivism. Ordering expressivism is a framework for developing an expressivist theory.
It can be implemented in various ways depending on a range of broader linguistic
andmetaethical issues. What ismost important for present purposes is the structure
of the solution disclosed by ordering expressivism. For concreteness it will help to ĕll
in some of the details. But I make no claim that the particular theory to follow is the
I use expressions like ‘≲-best’ to emphasize that ‘best’ is being used neutrally to refer to the
maximal elements of the preorder, regardless of the dimension along which those elements are being
ranked. e preorders in question needn’t rank worlds along a speciĕcally evaluative dimension.
Making use of orderings thus doesn’t prejudge the question of whether to go in for a teleological
normative theory, or even a maximizing theory.
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only adequate way of implementing ordering expressivism—or even that the gen-
eral ordering expressivist framework constitutes the only way of solving the Frege-
Geach problem. Indeed, I welcome the development of alternatives with which the
present account may be compared.
What attitude should we say is represented by ≲ in the formal semantics? Not
just any choice of attitude will do. Here are three constraints. First, the attitudemust
be a practical attitude. If we are to capture the practical character of normative lan-
guage and judgment, the attitude we choose to explain the meanings of normative
terms must itself be practical in nature. It must be action-guiding and motivat-
ing; it must regulate choice and behavior. Relatedly, second, the attitude must be
expressivist-friendly. It mustn’t require being understood in terms of belief. ird,
the attitude must have a logic. Given that normative sentences have logical prop-
erties, can stand in logical relations, and can ĕgure in valid reasoning, the attitude
expressed by normative sentences must impose certain logical constraints.
For concreteness I will follow Dreier in starting with an attitude of preference.
But since ≲ is a preorder, I suggest, naturally enough, that we interpret it as the at-
titude of weak preference, or “preferring at least as much.” is choice of attitude
has several advantages. First, weak preference is clearly a practical attitude. Its con-
nection with action is well studied in decision theory. Second, weak preference is
plausibly expressivist-friendly. emajority view is that it needn’t be construed as a
belief that one alternative is at least as good as another. ird, there are rich liter-
atures in preference logic and decision theory describing and justifying the logical
properties of and coherence constraints on preferences (§.). Fourth, there is a
tradition in preference logic of treating weak preference as the primitive relation.
is independent research provides a promising basis for an expressivist account of
the meaning of normative language.
(Some theorists who mark a fundamental distinction between evaluative vo-
cabulary (‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘beautiful’, ‘desirable’, ‘base’) and deontic vocabulary (‘must’,
‘may’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘permissible’, ‘obligatory’, ‘forbidden’) may wish to say that the
former, but not the latter, express weak preferences. Such theorists may recast the
ensuing discussion in terms of capturing the logical inconsistency between, say, sen-
tences about what is evaluatively best and their negations. Since this isn’t the place
to take up issues concerning the relation between deontic and evaluative language
and attitudes, for expository purposes I will simply assume that our example deontic
For relevant discussion, see, e.g., S , L , B , , B & H-
 .
Classic references include R , D  . , D . For survey
discussion, see, e.g., H , H & G-Y .
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modal sentences express weak preferences. eorists with diﬀerent commitments
about speciĕcally deontic language may feel free to recast our discussion in terms
of their preferred choice of attitude, assuming it meets the constraints described
above.)
An agent’s weak preferences inherit the logic of the preorder. Just as we say that
ordinary belief states are inconsistent if they aren’t representable in terms of a non-
empty set of worlds, so the expressivist may say that states of weak preference are
inconsistent if they aren’t representable in terms of a non-empty preorder. Of course
at the end of the day she will need some explanation for why having preferences that
aren’t representable in this way is incoherent— just like how everyone, expressivists
and non-expressivists alike, needs an analogous story in the case of belief. And she
must show how the relevant sort of incoherence is of the right kind to underwrite
explanations of the logical inconsistency of normative sentences— just like how an
expressivist, like Schroeder, who appeals to A-type inconsistency (§.) must ex-
plain why a given type of attitude (belief, being for) is “inconsistency transmitting,”
i.e. why it is such that bearing it toward inconsistent contents is incoherent in a way
that explains the logical inconsistency of sentences (or, more generally, why logi-
cal relations among the objects of the attitude place constraints on the logic of the
attitude itself). Accounts of preferential incoherence are well-known, and the lit-
eratures on them vast (nn. –). I won’t attempt to oﬀer such an account here.
Suﬃce it to say that it is independently plausible that there are coherence constraints
on preferences, and that these constraints are of the right sort to underwrite funda-
mental semantic explanations. Atminimumwehavemade progress if we can reduce
expressivism’s problem with negation to the familiar, more tractable problem in de-
cision theory of explaining why preferences that don’t satisfy certain constraints are
incoherent.
e expressivist can then use the logical properties of preferences to capture the
logical properties of certain normative sentences. For instance, the familiar truth-
conditions for and , along with their ordering expressivist interpre-
tation, are given in ()–(), respectively.
() a.  is true at w, according to ≲, iﬀ Alice gives to the poor in all the≲-best worlds
b.  expresses an attitude of having all of one’s most weakly preferred
alternatives be ones where Alice gives to the poor
() a.   is true at w, according to ≲, iﬀ Alice doesn’t give to the poor
in some of the ≲-best worlds
b.   expresses an attitude of having some of one’s most weakly

preferred alternatives be ones where Alice doesn’t give to the poor
So, in response to the negation problem, we can say that  and   are
inconsistent because their conjunction expresses an incoherent set of weak prefer-
ences. It is incoherent to have all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be ones
where Alice helps the poor and some of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be
ones where Alice doesn’t help the poor. ere is no (non-empty) preorder that rep-
resents such a body of preferences. Preferential incoherence appears to be the right
kind of inconsistency in attitude to explain the inconsistency between normative
sentences ‘’ and ‘¬’.
Taking the weak preference attitude as basic, we can deĕne in terms of it var-
ious other attitudes intuitively expressed by normative sentences— e.g., requiring,
permitting, merely permitting, and forbidding. To a ĕrst approximation: A requires
 iﬀ all A’s most weakly preferred alternatives are -worlds; A permits  iﬀ some
of A’s most weakly preferred alternatives are -worlds; Amerely permits  iﬀ some
but not all of A’s most weakly preferred alternatives are -worlds; and A forbids 
iﬀ all of A’s most weakly preferred alternatives are ¬-worlds. By deĕning requir-
ing and permitting in terms of the single basic attitude of weak preference, we can
avoid the worries discussed in § with taking, say, the attitude of requiring as basic
and then deĕning permitting in terms of failing to require or disagreeing with re-
quiring. e inconsistency between requiring  and permitting ¬—the attitudes
intuitively expressed by  and  , respectively— is explained in terms
of the incoherence of the preferences in terms of which they are deĕned.
In this way, the expressivist can import developments in truth-conditional se-
mantics for modals, though with some interpretive tweaks. I have shown how she
can do so in terms of a standard ordering semantics because of its familiarity. But
adoption of this kind of ordering semantics, or any ordering semantics for that mat-
ter, isn’t essential to the underlying expressivist maneuver. Even if an alternative
way of analyzingmodals proves to be superior, the expressivist will be able to imple-
ment our general strategy as long as there is some particular element in the analysis
corresponding to the normative reading of the expression (e.g., the preorder in an
ordering semantics), where the structure of this element captures any logical rela-
tions among sentences containing normative terms. Given requirements of com-
positionality and empirically adequacy, it is hard to see how a successful semantics
could fail to have this property. Despite its name, ordering expressivism needn’t be
held hostage to an ordering semantics for modals.
is point may become relevant depending on one’s broader views about the
semantics of modals and the nature of preference (or whatever practical attitude

is chosen)— e.g., concerning quantiĕcational vs. scalar semantics for modals; re-
lations among comparative and quantitative notions of possibility and probability;
information-sensitivity in normative modals; the objects of preference; the relation
between exclusionary and combinative preferences; and the justiĕcation of coher-
ence constraints on preference. A plurality of implementations of ordering expres-
sivism will be possible depending on one’s commitments on these sorts of issues.
How the semantics, metasemantics, philosophy of mind, psychology, and decision
theory interact and mutually constrain theorizing likely won’t be straightforward.
Moreover, for all I have said, the prospects of ordering expressivism may vary for
diﬀerent normative expressions and practical attitudes. It isn’t trivial that the best
philosophical interpretation of the best semantics for a given expression will be con-
sistent with expressivism.
Such complications needn’t detain us here. For present purposes, in what fol-
lows I will continue to assume a standard ordering semantics for modals coupled
with an interpretation of the preorder in terms of weak preference. e preorder on
worlds in the semantics can be understood as reĘecting preferences among max-
imally speciĕc possibilities. is coheres nicely with the standard use of maximal
states of aﬀairs (point propositions, or maximally consistent sets of sentences, in the
limiting case) as the objects of preference in decision theory and preference logic.
However, theremay be large equivalence classes in the preorder depending onwhich
features of the world are relevant to one’s preferences in the given context. Prefer-
ence relations on non-maximal possibilities may be relevant in the interpretation of
other kinds of normative expressions.
To take just one example: Many authors in the literature on information-sensitivity have argued
that a deontic modal’s domain of quantiĕcation can reĘect what alternatives are best given a relevant
body of information (e.g., K & MF , C  . , C a,
D , S a). If this is right, then certain deontic modal claims may be understood
as expressing one’s derived preferences given one’s information (beliefs, credences). (More on this in
§.) How one implements this would depend on one’s views about the details of the semantics and
how much decision-theoretic apparatus, if any, is explicitly encoded (e.g., whether there is an ex-
plicit representation of information-independent desires/utilities/values). anks to an anonymous
referee for raising this issue.
e literature on comparative modal notions may be relevant here (e.g., K , ,
P , L , K  . ; for related discussion on generating orderings on
propositions fromorderings onworlds, see L , H and references therein). Note
that the appeal to preferences on maximally speciĕc possibilities is neutral on whether preferences
on maximal vs. non-maximal possibilities are more fundamental. What is important for present
purposes is simply that there are preferences on maximal alternatives. ough decision theorists
standardly treat preference as a relation on (mutually exclusive, possibly singleton) sets of worlds,
this needn’t hinder the expressivist from utilizing a classic ordering semantics for modals, given the

. Indecision
In § we raised the challenge of capturing in an expressivist-friendly manner the
diﬀerence between indiﬀerence and indecision. In §. we considered Dreier’s re-
sponse and noted two limitations. First, it fails to distinguish indiﬀerence and in-
decision in certain agents with impoverished preferences. Second, it fails to distin-
guish two ways in which one’s preferences can be incomplete. Indecision is distinct
from having incomparabilities in one’s preferences. Given the coherence of think-
ing that one might ĕnd oneself in a practical dilemma, there is a third attitude to be
explained: the attitude of decidedly treating as incomparable. In this section I will
argue that the expressivist can distinguish these attitudes by showing how they en-
code diﬀerent practical dispositions— speciĕcally, diﬀerent dispositions in choice
situations. (To be clear, the aim isn’t to reduce these attitudes to patterns of choice
behavior. Choice behavior is treated as revealing attitudes, not as constituting them.)
Start with distinguishing indiﬀerence from decidedly treating as incomparable.
Much work in revealed preference theory has concerned how to derive a preference
order among alternatives by treating choice as basic. Agents aremodeled by choice
functions which select elements from (ĕnite) sets of options. An agent’s choices are
treated as revealing her psychological state of mind, her preferences. Traditionally,
choosing both alternatives u and v from an option set has been interpreted as reveal-
ing indiﬀerence between u and v. But an alternative is to interpret such a choice as
revealing that no other element in the option set is strictly preferred to u or v. is
might be because one is indiﬀerent between u and v, but it also might be because
one treats them as incomparable. Nevertheless we can distinguish these two types
of attitudes on the basis of further choice behavior. Results in E & O 
attest to the fruitfulness of the following approach. e technical details would take
us too far aĕeld, but the rough intuitive idea is this: We check if, for all choice sit-
uations, the agent chooses u whenever she chooses v and vice versa; we check if u
and v are treated identically in all occasions for choice that involve them. If they are,
this reveals that the agent is indiﬀerent between u and v. If they are not, she is better
regarded as treating u and v as incomparable.
systematic availability of reductions of preorders to partial orders (i.e., antisymmetric preorders, or
preorders without ties): for any preorder ≲ on worlds, there is a corresponding partial order on the
set of equivalence classes of worlds with respect to ≲. anks to an anonymous referee for pressing
me on these issues.
For classic discussions, see S , A , R , H ,
S .
See, e.g., N , S , E & O .
More precisely (cf. E & O : –): An agent treats u and v as incomparable if both

For example, suppose Alice must choose what beer to buy out of x, y, and z.
e relevant factors guiding her choice are taste and smell. As for taste, she strictly
prefers x to y and y to z. As for smell, she strictly prefers y to z and z to x. Since
she strictly prefers y to z with regard to both taste and smell, she will not choose z
when y is an option. But suppose that while Alice is still contemplating her choice
Bert swoops in and takes the last of beer y. Le with a choice between x and z, Alice
seems to have no way of choosing merely in light of her preferences; aer all, x is
preferred to z with regard to taste but z is preferred to x with regard to smell, and
(let’s suppose) she has no further preferences. Her choice set for {x; z} might thus
be {x; z} (in the sense that she might subjectively randomize choice between x and
z). However, we can determine that Alice treats x and z as incomparable and isn’t
indiﬀerent between them in light of her further choice behavior. For there is some
other choice situation that doesn’t contain (say) z—namely, where the option set
is {x; y}—with respect to which x and z aren’t treated symmetrically: whereas x
is choosable out of {x; y}, z isn’t choosable out of {z; y}, the set that results from
swapping x with z, as we have seen. (In terms of the deĕnition in note , it is the
(a)-condition that is satisĕed.)
Now turn to indecision. In theory of choice, there is a requirement that an agent
must, when given a set of options, select a subset of that set. Dropping this require-
ment, by allowing as a possible response the action of positively refraining from
choosing, seems to provide one natural way of characterizing indecision. Indeci-
sion between u and v would be revealed by (perhaps inter alia) deferring choice be-
tween u and v. It isn’t counterintuitive that if I am genuinely undecided between
u and v—e.g., because I have never considered the question of how to compare u
and v—I may, if presented with a choice between them, refuse to make a choice,
at least for the time being. Aer all, I haven’t worked out my preferences, and so
u and v are choosable from {u; v}— c ({u; v}) = {u; v}, for choice function c—and there exists a
(ĕnite, non-empty) set S of alternatives that contains u but not v, such that at least one of the following
holds, where S∗ ∶= (S ∪ {v}) /{u}, i.e., the option set that results from swapping u with v:
a. u ∈ c(S) ∧ v ∉ c(S∗)
b. u ∉ c(S) ∧ v ∈ c(S∗)
c. c(S)/{u} ≠ c(S∗)/{v}
E & O  prove that choice behavior that satisĕes a weakened version of theWeak Axiom of
Revealed Preference can be used to derive a unique, possibly incomplete preference relation (whose
strict part is suitably rich). e pairs which the agent treats as incomparable in the above sense can be
proven to be precisely those pairs which are incomparable relative to this preference relation. E
& O , as well as others in the tradition in theory of choice stemming from A , treat
themselves as characterizing indecision (via incomparabilities), but, for reasons discussed in §., I
prefer to interpret their results as characterizing the attitude of decidedly treating as incomparable.

any choice, even choosing both u and v, would give a false impression of my state of
mind. Indecision between alternatives, as revealed in this way, amounts to a kind
of unwillingness even to pick, or a preference to defer choosing among them.
I see two general ways in which this kind of indecision-revealing choice behav-
ior could be used to generate representations of agents’ states of mind: one intro-
duces more structure into the representation of normative beliefs; the other intro-
duces more structure into the representation of bodies of preferences themselves.
For space purposes I describe only the former option in the main text; I leave dis-
cussion of the latter option for an extended note (n. ). Before proceeding I want
to reiterate that the question of how to represent indecision is subordinate for the
expressivist to the question of how to characterize indecision. What is primary is
our characterization of indecision as a preference to defer choice, as revealed by a
refusal to choose. is is what undergirds our expressivist explanation for why a cer-
tain agent should count as being in a state of mind represented by the relevant type
of formal object. Nevertheless, although questions of how to represent indecision
may be of secondary importance, they are important just the same.
Our indecision-revealing choice behavior can be used to characterize a set of
preference preorders, representing ways in which the agent could coherently resolve
her indecision (complete her preferences) given the rest of her choice behavior. For
example, simplifying by only considering two alternatives u and v, the state of mind
of an agent who defers choosing between them could be modeled in terms of the set{≲;≲;≲}, where ≲, ≲, and ≲ are characterized as follows, representing strictly
preferring u to v, strictly preferring v to u, and being indiﬀerent between u and v,
respectively:≲∶ u < v≲∶ v < u≲∶ u ≲ v; v ≲ u
is choice of representation coheres nicely with standard representations of or-
dinary factual uncertainty. In ordinary possible worlds semantics, belief states are
represented as sets of worlds, the agent’s “doxastic alternatives,” those worlds com-
< (“is strictly preferred to”) is a strict partial order such that ∀u; v∶u < v ⇔ u ≲ v ∧ v ≴
u. One way of representing the action of failing to choose might be in terms of a partial choice
function that is undeĕned for certain sets of options. I am unaware of developments of this strategy
in revealed preference theory. As noted above, indecision, when discussed at all, is represented in
terms of incomparabilities, incorrectly in my opinion. is is certainly not the place to solve the
logical problem of how to generate (sets of) preference preorders from partial choice functions.

patible with her beliefs. Uncertainty about how the world is is represented by there
being a plurality of worlds in one’s doxastic alternatives. Becoming more opinion-
ated is modeled predictably, and intuitively, in terms of set intersection: Intersect
one’s previous doxastic alternatives with the set of worlds characterizing what one
comes to believe to yield the representation of one’s new belief state. For example, if
I am uncertain about whether grass is green, my doxastic alternatives include both
worlds in which grass is green and worlds in which grass is not green. If I come
to believe that grass is green, my new set of doxastic alternatives will be my old set
minus the worlds in which grass is not green. Similarly, an agent’s practical state of
mindmight be represented in terms of a set of weak preference preorders, the agent’s
“practical alternatives,” those preorders consistent with her preferences. Becoming
more decided about what to do can be modeled in the same way as becoming more
opinionated about the world. Generalizing, an agent’s total belief state might be
represented as a set of pairs ⟨w;≲⟩ of worlds and weak preference preorders.
Accordingly, even if individual preference preorders cannot fail to require 
without permitting ¬, we can still represent how an agent can fail to think that
 is required without thereby thinking that ¬ is permitted.
() A believes that is required iﬀ for allweakpreference preorders inA’s practi-
cal alternatives, all the most weakly preferred alternatives are -worlds (i.e.,
iﬀ all the weak preference preorders in A’s practical alternatives require ).
() A doesn’t believe that  is required iﬀ for some weak preference preorder in
A’s practical alternatives, some of the most weakly preferred alternatives are¬-worlds (i.e., iﬀ some of the weak preference preorders in A’s practical
alternatives permit ¬).
() A believes that ¬ is permitted iﬀ for all weak preference preorders in A’s
practical alternatives, some of the most weakly preferred alternatives are¬-worlds (i.e., iﬀ all of the weak preference preorders in A’s practical alter-
natives permit ¬).
is reĘects how failing to believe that  is required is weaker than believing that ¬
is permitted. e former holds only if some weak preference preorders consistent
with one’s preferences are a certain way, whereas the latter holds only if all the weak
preference preorders consistent with one’s preference are that way. Similarly, one
decidedly treats two alternatives as incomparable only if they are incomparable in
See H , L b, S ,  for classic discussions.

all the weak preference preorders in one’s practical alternatives.
In sum, I have suggested that the expressivist can distinguish the attitudes of
indecision, indiﬀerence, and decidedly treating as incomparable in terms of diﬀer-
ences in choice behavior. Indiﬀerence among alternatives is revealed by treating
them identically in all relevant occasions for choice. Treating them as incomparable
is revealed by not treating them identically in this way but still choosing all of them
when presented with all and only them. Indecision is revealed by deferring choice.
It remains to be seen how best to develop these ideas more comprehensively. Nev-
ertheless I take them to constitute a promising expressivist strategy. is strategy
avoids problems and limitations of previous approaches, like Dreier’s, as discussed
in §.. It is also independently interesting and attractive.
An alternative way of representing indecision is by enriching our representation of bodies of
preferences. Suppose we represent a body of weak preferences with a set of preorders rather than
a single preorder. Intuitively, we might think of each preorder in the set as representing a partial
strategy that the agent accepts, and the set of preorders as representing the agent’s overall plan for
action. A strategy, in the decision-theoretic sense, assigns a single act to every possible occasion for
choice. It represents what the agent takes to be a permissible course of action given her preferences.
One could then say that  is required according to a overall plan— the set of preorders— iﬀ for all
preorders in the set, all the most weakly preferred alternatives are -worlds; and that  is permitted
according to the overall plan iﬀ for some preorder in the set, all themost weakly preferred alternatives
are -worlds. is choice of representation entails that an overall plan can fail to require  without
thereby permitting ¬; ‘required’ and ‘permitted’ won’t be duals: It’s not the case that  is required
iﬀ for some preorder in the set, some of the ≲-best worlds are ¬-worlds; but ¬ is permitted iﬀ for
some preorder in the set, all the ≲-best worlds are ¬-worlds. And an overall plan can be undecided
about a single proposition without merely permitting it:  is merely permitted iﬀ for some but not
all of the preorders in the set, all the ≲-best worlds are -worlds; but the overall plan is undecided
about  if, e.g., for none of the preorders in the set, all the ≲-best worlds are -worlds. On this
representation, a subject’s practical state of mind has the same structure as a body of preferences.
Indecision is encoded in the representation of preference itself.
A brief example may be helpful. Suppose my overall plan consists of the following partial strate-
gies, represented as sets of propositions:  = {{I eat a cookie, I give to the poor};{I eat a brownie, I
give to the poor}}. (ese sets of propositions can determine preorders in the usual way: given a set of
propositions P, for any worlds u and v, u ≲P v iﬀ all propositions in P that are true in v are also true in
u.) On this overall plan, my eating a cookie andmy eating a brownie are bothmerely permitted, since
some but not all of my partial strategies entail that I take the action in question; my giving to the poor
is required since all of my partial strategies entail that I give to the poor; and I am undecided about
all other actions (not entailed by these), since they aren’t entailed by any of my partial strategies. So,
unlike hyperplans, overall plans in this sense needn’t be complete (or consistent: incomparabilities
may be represented by all of one’s partial strategies entailing contrary propositions).

 Beyond negation: e disjunction problem
Let’s recap. Ordering expressivism combines the virtues of Gibbard and Dreier in
themanner called for at the end of §. Following Dreier, semantic properties of sen-
tences, like inconsistency, are explained, fundamentally, in terms of (non-A-type)
coherence constraints on attitudes. Given the counterintuitive consequences of ex-
pressivist accounts framed in terms ofA-type inconsistency canvassed in S
a, it would be promising if an alternative way of solving the Frege-Geach prob-
lem was available. I take ordering expressivism to be one such alternative. Ordering
expressivism takes a single practical attitude to be explanatorily basic— e.g., weak
preference—and deĕnes the attitudes intuitively expressed by various kinds of nor-
mative sentences in terms of it. e logical relations between the “apparently logi-
cally unrelated attitudes” of, e.g., permitting and requiring are illuminated by deĕn-
ing both attitudes in terms of weak preference (S b: ; emphases
altered). Even if positing brute inconsistency relations between distinct attitudes is
problematic, explaining inconsistency relationships between attitudes in terms of
the logic of a more fundamental attitude is not. A-type inconsistency isn’t the only
legitimate kind of inconsistency in town.
Like Gibbard in his extension of possible worlds semantics, ordering expres-
sivismco-opts independentlymotivated apparatus from formal semantics onmodals,
but gives it a systematic expressivist interpretation. A concern some have with ex-
pressivism is that it seems to require us to rebuild compositional semantics from the
ground up. It would be unfortunate, to put it mildly, if we had to reexplain every-
thing that contemporary truth-conditional semantics has taught us. An advantage
of the general ordering expressivist strategy in §. is that it allows expressivists to
import developments in truth-conditional semantics for modals in giving her se-
mantics for normative terms. is provides a recipe for giving an expressivist ac-
count of complex normative sentences, and recovering the state of mind expressed
by a sentence from its compositional semantics: interpret all occurrences of ≲ in the
semantics in terms of the practical attitude associated with ≲. To a ĕrst approxima-
tion, some examples with conjunction, quantiĕers, and conditionals are as follows.
e (a)-examples give the ordinary truth-conditions; the (b)-examples give the at-
titude expressed. (In () I give the reading where ‘most’ takes wide scope.)
How one develops an expressivist treatment of deontic conditionals will depend on one’s
broader views on the syntax and semantics of diﬀerent types of implicitly and explicitly modalized
conditionals. ese issues, notoriously complex as they are, are complicated further by the fact that
conditionals are themselves constructions that have been subject to expressivist treatments. I oﬀer
the interpretation in () simply for illustrative purposes.

() a. ‘Alice has to give to the poor, and Bert has to give to the poor’ is true
at w, according to ≲, iﬀ Alice gives to the poor in all the ≲-best worlds
and Bert gives to the poor in all the ≲-best worlds.
b. ‘Alice has to give to the poor, and Bert has to give to the poor’ expresses
the attitude of having all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be
ones where Alice gives to the poor, and having all of one’s most weakly
preferred alternatives be ones where Bert gives to the poor.
() a. ‘Most people have to give to the poor’ is true at w, according to ≲, iﬀ
most people are such that they give to the poor in all the ≲-best worlds.
b. ‘Most people have to give to the poor’ expresses the attitude of having
all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be ones where, for most
(actual) people x, x gives to the poor.
() a. ‘If Alice has a job, she has to give to the poor’ is true at w, according to≲, iﬀ Alice gives to the poor in all the ≲-best worlds where Alice has a
job.
b. ‘If Alice has a job, she has to give to the poor’ expresses the attitude of
having all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives where Alice has
a job be alternatives where Alice gives to the poor.
Perhaps there are other types of normative sentences whose semantic properties the
expressivist cannot capture in this way. e devil will be in the details. But these
examples should give the expressivist a license for optimism.
Perhaps not for long. Mark Schroeder has objected that “expressivists cannot
directly apply the tools of truth-conditional semantics” (: ). Schroeder’s Ex-
hibit A: disjunction. In the remainder of this paper I will focus on Schroeder’s ob-
jection concerning “mixed disjunctions,” disjunctive sentences where one disjunct
expresses a pure belief state and the other disjunct expresses a pure practical state.
(Since Schroeder’s objection is partly technical in nature, some parts of this sec-
tion are, of necessity, a bit more formal than the others. To keep the discussion
generally accessible, I only mention those technical points that are directly rele-
vant to the philosophical issues. e important philosophical points should be clear
enough, I hope, even for readers less interested in the technical details.)
As noted in §., expressivists can implement their compositional semantics
with an extension of possible worlds semantics, treating the contents of sentences
as (determining) sets of pairs of worlds w and weak preference preorders ≲. But
because of   , she must provide a systematic way of in-
terpreting the formalism and characterizing what states of mind correspond to what

formal objects in such a way that explains the semantic properties of the sentences
that express those states of mind. In the special cases of “preference-independent”
and “world-independent” contents— sets of pairs such that if one pair is in the set,
so is every pair with the same w or ≲ coordinate, respectively— the expressivist has
a story: e former characterize ordinary factual beliefs, like the belief that grass is
green, and the latter characterize preferences, like the belief that murder is wrong.
But what should we say about contents that are neither preference-independent nor
world-independent? Schroeder objects that the expressivist cannot give an adequate
general answer to this question, and that, as a result, the expressivist interpretation
of mixed disjunctions is empirically incorrect.
Schroeder argues that, on certain natural assumptions, expressivism predicts
that if ‘’ is a non-normative sentence and ‘ ’ is a normative sentence, then it is
impossible to believe  ∨  without either believing  or believing  :
[I]f ‘’ is normative and ‘ ’ is non-normative, there is no state of pure
descriptive belief that someone who believes that ∨ is guaranteed to
be in, and there is no [pure preference state] that she is guaranteed to be
in. So ipso facto there is no combination of a descriptive belief state and
[pure preference state] that she is guaranteed to be in”; “But since we’re
assuming that the only states of mind there are are ordinary descriptive
beliefs, ordinary [preference states], and their combinations… on this
view there is no room for such a state. (: , , variables adapted;
cf. p. , a: –)
A bit more slowly: Giving ‘or’ its usual interpretation as set union, the content of the
state of mind expressed by the mixed disjunction ‘Alice doesn’t have a job or Alice
has to help the poor’ is as follows.
() {⟨w;≲⟩∶Alice doesn’t have a job inw, or Alice helps the poor in all the ≲-best
worlds}
Call this set ‘S’. Bert believes that Alice doesn’t have a job or she has to help the poor
iﬀ Bert’s total belief state—his doxastic-practical alternatives (§.; cf. n. )— is
a subset of S. But assuming that the only states of mind are ordinary factual be-
liefs and pure preference states and their combinations, then since S is the union of
a world-independent content (a content that only constrains ≲) and a preference-
independent content (a content that only constrains w), Bert can have this disjunc-
tive belief only if either Bert’s doxastic alternatives is a subset of S or Bert’s practical
alternatives is a subset of S. So Bert believes that Alice doesn’t have a job or she

has to help the poor only if either Bert believes that Alice doesn’t have a job or Bert
believes that Alice has to help the poor. But this is incorrect. Bert can believe that
Alice doesn’t have a job or she should help the poor but be uncertain about which.
One can believe a disjunction without believing either disjunct. So the expressivist
conĘates believing  ∨  with either believing  or believing  .
Like the case of the negation problem, this objection is partly technical and
partly interpretive. It is technical because we need a way of blocking the entailment
in question. It is interpretive because whatever story we tell about how to block this
entailment, we need to be able to interpret the resulting apparatus so as to explain
what states of mind are expressed by disjunctive sentences and how these states of
mind are logically related to other states of mind.
As Schroeder notes, an intuitive way of thinking of the attitude expressed by a
disjunctive sentence is in terms of Blackburn’s () notion of “being tied to a tree”.
A disjunction ‘∨ ’ can be understood as expressing a conditional commitment to
take on the attitude expressed by ‘’ upon rejecting the attitude expressed by ‘ ’, and
vice versa. e now familiar problem for the expressivist, though, is that we have
introduced another attitude— the attitude of being tied to a tree— and wemust ex-
plain how it is logically related to the other attitudes in the expressivist’s repertoire so
as to capture the logical relations among disjunctive and non-disjunctive sentences.
For example, we need to capture how ‘ ∨  ’, ‘¬’, and ‘¬ ’ are logically inconsis-
tent. But the situation isn’t hopeless. e attitude of being tied to a tree needn’t be
construed as an attitude that is “logically unrelated” to the attitudes of requiring,
permitting, etc. Taking up our strategy in response to the negation problem, if we
can derive these attitudes from a common core we can capture their logical relations
sans stipulation.
Before turning to questions of interpretation, observe that Schroeder’s objec-
tion fails if we drop the assumption that total belief states must be characterized
into a purely descriptive component and a purely practical component, or that “the
only states of mind there are are ordinary descriptive beliefs, ordinary [preference
states], and their combinations.” e reason for Schroeder’s assumption, of course,
For a simple example, suppose our model contains only the following world-preference pairs:⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩. Suppose we have a non-normative sentence ‘’ and a normative
sentence ‘ ’ such that JK = {⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩} and J K = {⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩}, so that JK∪ J K ={⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩}. (JK is the set of world-preference pairs that verify .) Suppose that
Alice believes  ∨  . en BelA ⊆ JK ∪ J K, where BelA is the set of ⟨w;≲⟩ pairs that characterize
Alice’s total belief state. If, as Schroeder suggests, BelA must be a subset of the intersection of only
world-independent and preference-independent sets of ⟨w;≲⟩ pairs— that is, if Alice’s belief state
must be characterizable only in terms of purely descriptive beliefs and purely practical beliefs— then

is a worry that the expressivist lacks a systematic way of interpreting sets of world-
preference pairs that are neither world-independent nor preference-independent.
But our solution to the negation problem suggests a natural response. I suggest that
we characterize these states in terms of ordinary belief and conditional (weak) pref-
erence. One might worry about introducing a new attitude, but the attitude of con-
ditional preference, its logic, and its connection with belief and action are already
well studied in decision theory and preference logic. Preferences— like norms, val-
ues, goals, etc.— typically don’t come in the form of blunt categorical injunctions.
ey aren’t usually of the form No matter what, !. Rather they oen come with
conditions under which they apply. For instance, if I want to go for a run, my pref-
erence needn’t be that I go for a run, come what may. More plausibly it is that I go
for a run given that it’s sunny, that I’m not injured, that I didn’t just eat a burrito, and
so on. Our preferences are oen conditional, preferences for certain circumstances.
(Categorical preferences can be treated as preferences that hold conditional on any
possibility.)
us far I have been treating modals as interpreted with respect to preorders.
But since modals can themselves occur in intensional contexts, it is standard in or-
dering semantics to index preorders to a world of evaluation (written ‘≲w’). Which
preorder is relevant for the interpretation of a given modal sentence can depend on
how things happen to be in the actual world, or on how things could be but aren’t or
could have been but weren’t. is suggests a natural way of representing conditional
preferences. We can represent a body of conditional preferencewith a function from
worlds to preorders. Call such a function a preorder function. Intuitively, a preorder
function w:≲w encodes one’s preferences for the situation of w being actual; an in-
dexed preorder ≲w represents one’s preferences given the relevant circumstances in
w. (Hereaer I use the unindexed ‘≲’ as short for ‘w:≲w’ to denote preorder func-
tions.) Suppose I prefer to go for a run given that it’s sunny, and I prefer not to run
given that it isn’t sunny. Letting S and S be representatives of relevant equivalence
classes of worlds where it’s sunny and not sunny, respectively, we can represent these
conditional preferences with a preorder function ≲ that is such that worlds where I
run are, other things equal, ≲S-better than worlds where I don’t run, and is such that
it indeed follows that BelA ⊆ JK∨BelA ⊆ J K, that is, that Alice believes or Alice believes . (Given
that BelA ⊆ JK ∪ J K, the only total belief states that are the intersection of world- and preference-
independent sets of world-preference pairs are JK, J K, {⟨w;≲⟩}, {⟨w;≲⟩}, and {⟨w;≲⟩}, and
each of these is either a (possibly improper) subset of JK or a (possibly improper) subset of J K. So
if BelA ⊆ JK ∨ J K, then BelA ⊆ JK or BelA ⊆ J K.) But dropping Schroeder’s assumption blocks
the entailment, for the following total belief states that are (possibly improper) subsets of JK ∪ J K
neither entail  nor entail  : JK ∪ J K itself, and {⟨w;≲⟩; ⟨w;≲⟩}.

worlds where I don’t run are, other things equal, ≲S-better than worlds where I do
(n. ).
In this way, preorder functions can be interpreted as preferences conditional on
maximally speciĕc possibilities. As in §., this isn’t to deny that agents have pref-
erences conditional on non-maximal possibilities, and it is neutral on the relation
between preferences conditional on maximal vs. non-maximal possibilities. Since
not all circumstances in a world may be relevant to one’s preferences, just as the pre-
orders themselves may permit ties (they needn’t be antisymmetric), so too preorder
functions may map diﬀerent worlds to the same preorder (they needn’t be injec-
tive). Representing bodies of conditional preference with preorder functions has
the advantage of utilizing existing apparatus from contemporary ordering seman-
tics for modals. However, like in §., alternative implementations will be possible
depending on one’s broader views about the sorts of issues mentioned there.
A world-preference pair now consists of a possible world w and a body of pref-
erences conditional on w being actual. e singleton {⟨w;≲w⟩} represents a fully
opinionated and decided state of mind; it represents a belief state that is settled on
w being the actual world, and a body of conditional preferences ≲, which together
determine the preferences ≲w. Generalizing, an arbitrary set of world-preference
pairs {⟨i;≲i⟩; ⟨j;≲j⟩; : : : ; ⟨u;≲∗u⟩; ⟨v;≲∗v ⟩; : : :} represents a belief state that is compat-
ible with i, j, u, v, : : : , and a preference state compatible with ≲ conditional on i, j, : : : ,≲∗ conditional on u, v, : : : , and so on; it represents a state of uncertainty and indeci-
sion. For example, the set {⟨w;≲w⟩; ⟨w;≲w⟩; ⟨w;≲w⟩} represents a state of mind
that is uncertain about whether w or w is actual, and is undecided about whether
to have the preferences ≲w , ≲w , or ≲w . ere are two important things to notice
about this: First, indecision in one’s preferences can be the result of uncertainty, but
it doesn’t have to be. Second, one’s preference state needn’t be independent of one’s
beliefs.
Let’s consider a concrete example to illustrate how appealing to conditional pref-
erences, and representing them in terms of preorder functions, can help solve the
disjunction problem. Let J, J, G, and G be (representatives of equivalence classes of)
relevant worlds in which Alice has or doesn’t have a Job, and Gives or doesn’t give
to the poor. And let ≲; : : : ;≲ be preorder functions with the following properties:≲∶ G <J G; G <J G≲∶ G <J G; G <J G≲∶ G <J G; G <J G≲∶ G <J G; G <J G

Intuitively, ≲ represents a preference thatAlice give to the poor regardless ofwhether
she has a job; ≲ represents a preference that Alice give to the poor iﬀ she has a job;≲ represents a preference that Alice give to the poor iﬀ she doesn’t have a job; and≲ represents a preference that Alice not give to the poor regardless of whether she
has a job. e contents of ‘Alice doesn’t have a job’ (¬job) and ‘Alice has to give to
the poor’ (M(give)), then, are as follows:
J¬jobK ={⟨w;≲w⟩∶Alice doesn’t have a job in w} ={⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩}JM(give)K ={⟨w;≲w⟩∶Alice gives to the poor in all the ≲w-best worlds} ={⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩}
e content of the mixed disjunction ‘Alice doesn’t have a job or she has to give to
the poor’ is the union of these sets:
J¬job ∨M(give)K =J¬jobK ∪ JM(give)K ={⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩}
For concreteness, consider the following subset of this set, T = {⟨J;≲J ⟩; ⟨J;≲J ⟩}. e
crucial question is this: What state of mind is represented by T? Intuitively, it is the
state of mind of being uncertain about whether Alice has a job, and of preferring
that she give to the poor conditional on her having a job and preferring that she not
give to the poor conditional on her not having a job. It is a state of uncertainty and
indecision (in this case, where the indecision derives from the uncertainty). Since
T is a subset of the content of the mixed disjunction but not of the content of either
disjunct, if T represents Bert’s total state of mind, then Bert counts as believing that
Alice doesn’t have a job or has to give to the poor, without believing thatAlice doesn’t
have a job or believing that she has to give to the poor. e inference from believing
 ∨  to believing  or believing  is blocked.
To be clear, the proposal is not that utterances of mixed disjunctions conven-
tionally express simple conditional preferences— e.g., preferences that hold condi-
tional on the negation of a factual antecedent. Saying this would fail to provide a
general interpretation of disjunction. For instance, it won’t apply to disjunctions in
which each disjunct is normative. It also naturally raises a worry that disjunctions in
which one disjunct is itself a mixed disjunction will require us to iterate the “go con-

ditional” strategy past the point where we have an independent grasp on the posited
attitude (what would conditional conditional preference be?). An agentmight count
as believing that Alice doesn’t have a job or she has to give to the poor in virtue of
having a standing conditional preference for Alice give to the poor given that she a
job. But having this conditional preference isn’t necessary for believing the mixed
disjunction. It isn’t the state of mind conventionally expressed by an utterance of¬job∨M(give). e attitude conventionally expressed by an utterance of a sentence
‘’ is the least committal way of thinking that .
Rather, the strategy is to give a general recipe for interpreting arbitrary sets of
world-preference pairs in terms of ordinary beliefs about ways the world might be
and preferences that hold conditional on the world being certain of those ways (see
above). is recipe is to apply to any disjunction, whether mixed or non-mixed,
simple or complex. Indeed, it is to apply to any sentence (or at least any sentence
whose content is a set of world-preference pairs). e strategy is this:
How to solve the disjunction problem:
. Give disjunction the formal semantics we would normally give it. (E.g., treat
the content of ‘∨ ’ as the union of the content of ‘’ and the content of ‘ ’.)
. Drop the assumption that total belief states must be factorable into purely
descriptive and purely practical components.
. Give a general way of interpreting (i.e., characterizing what states of mind
correspond to) arbitrary sets of world-preference pairs.
. Apply this general strategy to the case of the contents of disjunctive sentences.
. Note that Schroeder’s problematic entailment is blocked.
By giving a general way of characterizing what states of mind are represented by ar-
bitrary sets of world-preference pairs, the ordering expressivist can drop Schroeder’s
assumption in Step  above, and can do so in such a way that explains the logical
relations amongmixed states ofmind and their pure counterparts, and, thus, among
Treating disjunctions with normative disjuncts as conventionally expressing attitudes of indeci-
sion (perhaps among other things) is compatible with granting that one can accept such disjunctions
without being undecided. is is no diﬀerent from the ordinary factual case. Disjunctions with ordi-
nary factual sentences conventionally express attitudes of uncertainty, though one can accept them
while being certain about which disjunct is true.
eremay ultimately be reasons for further complicating the proposed representations of semantic
contents and states of mind in light of independent issues concerning epistemic vocabulary (‘might’,
‘probably’, etc.). See note ; for speciĕc discussion of disjunction in epistemic expressivist theories,
see R , S .

disjunctive and non-disjunctive sentences. is allows us to block problematic en-
tailments in cases with mixed disjunctions, and distinguish believing  ∨  from
believing  or believing  . More generally, in providing such a recipe for interpret-
ing arbitrary sets of world-preference pairs, we can give a systematic expressivist
interpretation of normative, descriptive, and mixed language. It is in this way that
ordering expressivism makes progress toward a “fast track” solution to the Frege-
Geach problem (§).
 Conclusion
Despite its checkered past, expressivism has found robust support in a variety of
domains. In the case of normative judgment, expressivism promises, among other
things, a substantive account of its distinctive practical character, a feature that al-
ternative theories that assimilate normative judgment to ordinary factual judgment
oen struggle to capture. But it is oen thought expressivism has intractable prob-
lems with capturing the meanings and logical properties of complex sentences, and
so cannot make good on this promise.
I have argued that we can make progress in eliminating expressivism’s semantic
stumbling block by developing what I call ordering expressivism. By interdeĕning
the attitudes intuitively expressed by normative sentences in terms of a single basic
practical attitude, the expressivist can capture the logical relations among these atti-
tudes and thus among the sentences that express them. ough I have focused on the
particular cases of negation and disjunction, the structure of our solution suggests a
more general strategy for implementing an expressivist semantics. Ordering expres-
sivism co-opts developments from linguistic semantics for modals by systematically
interpreting the orderings in these analyses in terms of a suitable practical attitude.
ough expressivism does make novel claims about semantic explanation and the
nature of normative language and judgment, it needn’t reinvent the compositional
semantic wheel. is, I hope, will prompt renewed interest in other distinctive as-
pects of expressivism, as in philosophy of mind and psychology.
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